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INTRODUCTION

The adoption of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) I by Congress
in 1980, coupled with the present trend by state and federal governments toward adopting more expansive environmental legislation, has amplified the conflict between environmental laws and
the Bankruptcy Code (Code),2 resulting in an ever increasing
amount of time and money spent on litigation. It is clear that on
both a theoretical and a practical level these two areas of law continue to conflict 3 causing protracted and often costly legal dis1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-2075 (1988).
3. See e.g., In re Quanta Resources., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd,
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putes. 4 These problems have intensified recently due largely to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,5 the implications of

which are still being played out in courts across the nation. One
of the primary problems created by the Midlantic decision has

been the potential exposure of bankruptcy trustees to personal
liability under federal and state environmental laws.
This Comment will examine the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee under both CERCIA and state environmental laws,
with a particular emphasis on the impact of the Midlantic decision
on the potential liability of bankruptcy trustees under such laws.
This Comment will initially review the relevant policies and provisions of both the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. This Comment
will then present a brief overview of the Midlantic decision and its
impact on the conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and federal
and state environmental laws. Finally, this Comment will ex-

amine those situations where a bankruptcy trustee could be held
personally liable in a bankruptcy proceeding involving assets of a
debtor which are contaminated by hazardous wastes.
474 U.S. 494 (1986) (purposes of Bankruptcy Code and state environmental
laws "cannot be reconciled where the trustee legitimately invokes his power to
abandon [contaminated property of the estate]"); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984) (policies of Bankruptcy Code and state environmental laws potentially conflict); In re Hemingway
Transp., Inc., 73 Bankr. 494, 499 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (court confronted with
"seemingly intractable problem ... result[ing] from two competing governmental concerns, namely concern for debtors and concern for the environment."); In
re Distrigas Corp., 66 Bankr. 382, 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) ("[T]wo important
government concerns appear to be in conflict.") But see Note, Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: The Problem of Hazardous
Wastes and the Bankrupt Firm, 38 MERCER L. REV. 693, 713 (1987) ("Thus, the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and the purposes of the federal environmental
laws are not mutually exclusive or antagonistic") [hereinafter Hazardous Wastes
and the Bankrupt Firm].
4. In the case of In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc. the bankruptcy court approved a $3,250,000 claim against the debtor for the cleanup of polluted property. 115 Bankr. 559, 562 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). The cost of the cleanup of
only one of two waste sites in the case of Midlantic Nat ' Bank v. New Jersey Dep 't of
Envtl. Protection was $2,500,000. 474 U.S. 494, 498 (1986). In In re Hemingway
Transport, Inc. the Environmental Protection Agency demanded $2,100,000 in
cleanup costs from a potentially liable party. 105 Bankr. 171, 173 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989).
5. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). For a further discussion of the Midlantic decision
and its impact, see infra notes 44-63 & 92-129 and accompanying text.
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THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND CERCLA

The Bankruptcy Code

The core purposes of the Code are to provide the bankruptcy
debtor with a "fresh start" 6 and to facilitate the dispensation of
the creditors' claims against the debtor. 7 The Code is designed
to provide the debtor with relief from and eventual dismissal of
debts, thus allowing the debtor to begin anew. 8 At the same time,
by facilitating the collection and liquidation of the debtor's assets,
the Code seeks to maximize the amount of compensation available to creditors out of the debtor's estate before final dismissal
of their claims. 9 The bankruptcy process begins when a bankruptcy petition is filed either by the debtor voluntarily,' 0 or by the
debtor's creditors." After the confirmation of the petition by a
bankruptcy court, a trustee is appointed to oversee the debtor's
estate. 12 Under the Code, a debtor' 3 has the option of either liq6. Traditionally, one purpose of Bankruptcy law was to provide the debtor
with a "fresh start." Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913). However,
the present Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, does not allow the debts of
"nonindividuals" (corporations and partnerships) to be discharged under Chapter 7 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). Thus, for nonindividual debtors, the
fresh start purpose of Chapter 7 has been abrogated. See In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 n.7 (1984).
7. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930). "The broad purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
estate among creditors holding just demands." Id. at 227; see also In re Franklin
Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 270 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) ("[t]he underlying purpose of abandonment is to enable the trustee to efficiently reduce the debtor's
property to money for distribution to creditors").
8. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
9. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 303. Following the confirmation of a petition for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate which is separate and distinct from the debtor is
created. 11 U.S.C. § 541. The assets of the debtor are then placed into the
bankruptcy estate. Id.
12. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, an interim trustee must be appointed once
the court accepts the bankruptcy petition. II U.S.C. § 701. The interim trustee
serves only until a regular trustee is appointed pursuant to section 702. 11
U.S.C. § 702. Conversely, under section 1104, the court has the power to appoint a trustee in a Chapter 11 proceeding only upon the request of a "party in
interest," and only for cause or if the appointment is "in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate." II U.S.C.
§ 1104(a).
13. For the purposes of this Comment, the provisions of the Code dealing
with individual debtors will not be covered as generally, only corporate or commercial debtors own or operate polluted or contaminated property. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330. Furthermore, eligibility under the individual debtor provisions is limited by the amount and type of debts of the debtor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(e). These limits, considering the costs involved in the cleanup of most
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uidating its assets under Chapter 7,14 or "reorganizing" under
Chapter 11.15 A Chapter 7 liquidation entails the conversion into
cash of all of the debtors assets not exempted by the Code and
the distribution of these proceeds to creditors.' 6 In contrast,
Chapter 11 may be utilized by a debtor to both reorganize its
business and restructure and pay back a certain amount of its previous debts. 17
A bankruptcy trustee is given certain powers, duties, and obligations under the Code which it is required to carry out. 18
Under section 323 a trustee is the "representative of the estate,"
and "has the capacity to sue and be sued."' 19 Additionally, section
363 authorizes the trustee to "use, sell, or lease" property of the
estate. 20 Beyond these general powers, duties, and purposes, the
the
obligations of a trustee may differ depending on whether
21
debtor is subject to Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Code.
Under Chapter 7, the main duty of a trustee is to "collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee
polluted properties, generally preclude the debtor from using the individual
debtor provisions.
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
15. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
16. Id. §§ 701-766. Exemptions under the Code are dealt with in section
522. Id. § 522. These exemptions are designed with an individual or Chapter
13 debtor in mind, and are not really relevant to a debtor facing environmental
liability. Id.
17. Id. §§ 1101-1174. The end product of a Chapter 11 reorganization is
supposed to be a healthy and operational business. To this end a Chapter 11
debtor may operate its business during bankruptcy as a way of both maintaining
the business and providing income with which to pay off its creditors. Id.
§ 1107. See Comment, Abandonment of Toxic Wastes Under Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 353, 355 (1988) [hereinafter Toxic Wastes Under the
Bankruptcy Code].
18. 11 U.S.C. § 323.
19. Id. § 323. Under the Bankruptcy Code the trustee does not technically
hold title to the property of the estate, but nonetheless has "certain powers associated with ownership." In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 283 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 363. Under section 363(c), the trustee has the power to
operate the debtor's business "in the ordinary course of business." Id. The
trustee further has the power to operate the debtor's business not in the ordinary course of business, but this requires notice to creditors of the estate and a
court hearing. Id. § 363(b). Essentially section 363 gives the trustee the ability
to run the debtors business as may be necessary in the course of the bankruptcy
proceeding. "[T]he Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management authority over the debtor." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985).
21. For a discussion of the general powers, duties, and purposes of a bankruptcy trustee, see supra note 12 and infra notes 23, 26 & 27 and accompanying
text.
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serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible
with the best interests of the parties in interest." 22 Therefore, a
Chapter 7 trustee's actions are carried out with the intent of collecting, liquidating, and distributing as much of the debtor's
23
property to creditors as possible.
In contrast, Chapter 1 1 focuses on the reorganization of the
debtor's estate. 24 Unlike a Chapter 7 proceeding in which a
trustee must be appointed, whether a trustee is appointed under
Chapter 11 is determined by the court. 2 5 Once a trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the trustee acts essentially
as, and in place of, the debtor with respect to the bankruptcy estate. 2 6 Under Chapter 11, a trustee is authorized to operate and
reorganize the debtor's business. 2 7 Any actions taken are thus
taken with the intent of ending bankruptcy with an operational
28
business.
B.

CERCLA

Adopted by Congress in 1980 to address the problem of generated environmental waste, CERCLA operates by using "a trust
fund ... known as the 'Hazardous Substance Superfund,' " more
22. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1).
23. See Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); In re Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The purpose of a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 . . . is to provide a fair distribution of the
debtor's assets among the creditors; to that end, a trustee for the creditors is
appointed by the court or elected by the creditors"). Id. To the extent necessary
to carry out the liquidation, a Chapter 7 trustee does have the limited power to
operate the debtor's business, but such power must first be authorized by the
bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 721.
24. See Comment, Toxic Wastes Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 17, at
355.
25. For a discussion of when a trustee is appointed under the Bankruptcy
Code, see supra note 12.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1106. In this regard section 1106(a)(1) requires the trustee
to perform basic trustee functions enumerated under section 704 of the Code.
Id. § 1106(a)(1). Further, section 1106 (a)(2) requires that the trustee perform
the basic duties of the debtor required by section 521 of the Code. Id.
§ 1106(a)(2). In addition, section 1106(a)(5) requires that the trustee either
submit a plan of reorganization, tell the court why the trustee will not submit
such a plan, or "recommend conversion of the case to a case under Chapter 7,
12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of the case." Id. 1106(a)(5).
27. Id. § 1108. As noted previously, a Chapter 7 trustee must first get court
approval before operating the debtor's business. Id. § 721. The Chapter 11
trustee, however, has automatic approval to operate the debtor's business unless
the court revokes that authorization. Id. § 1108.
28. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); Cross Elec.
Co., v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 511, 512-13 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 664 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1981).
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commonly known as "Superfund." 2 9 Under CERCLA the President is authorized to require the liable party or parties to cleanup
the hazardous waste site, or in the alternative, to authorize the
government, under the auspices of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), to cleanup the site with funds taken from
"Superfund." 3 0 The EPA may then bring suit against the respon3
sible party or parties for the reimbursement of expended funds. '
Furthermore, the EPA is authorized under CERCLA section 106
to obtain such injunctive relief "as may be necessary" when the
public health or safety is threatened by the release or potential
32
release of a hazardous substance.
Liability under CERCLA is expansive, and courts in the past
decade have consistently enlarged the categories of persons liable
under the Act.33 Section 10 7 (a) of the Act imposes liability on
four classes of persons: (1) the present owner and operator of a
"facility"; 3 4 (2) any past owner of a facility who owned the facility
29. I.R.C. § 9507 (1988). The Superfund is created by section 9507 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Id. Funding for the Superfund is obtained from taxes
on the environment, and from monies recovered under the various sections of
CERCLA. Id.
30. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
31. Id. Where there is the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, the President is "authorized to act . . . to remove or arrange for the
removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance.... or take any other response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment." Id. § 104(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(1). CERCIA section 104 (a)(1) gives the President the power to take action to clean up
hazardous waste sites. Id. CERCLA section 104(b) gives the President the
power to sue the liable parties for Superfund monies expended for the clean up
of hazardous waste sites. Id. § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b).
32. Id. § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
33. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990)
(parent corporation liability), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990) (lender liability), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (successor corporation liability), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1029(1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas Inc., 849 F.2d
1568 (1988) (generator liability); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (present owner and operator liability).
34. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCIA section 101(9) defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does'not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
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at the time of the disposal of "hazardous substances"; 3 5 (3) any
person who generated hazardous waste or arranged for the transport or disposal of hazardous waste; and (4) any person who ac36
cepts or accepted hazardous waste for transport or disposal.
Such liability
is imposed not only where hazardous substances are
"released," 3 7 but also where there is a "threatened release" of a
hazardous substance.3 8 Liability under CERCLA is also joint and
several, thus a single liable party could be forced to pay the entire
costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. 39 Further, section
35. "Hazardous substance" is defined at CERCLA section 101(14). Id.
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
36. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) of CERCILA states the
following:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title ....
Id.
37. The term "release" is defined under section 10 1(22). Id. § 101(22), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(22).
38. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Where there is a substantial threat of the release of a hazardous substance or a "substantial threat of
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare," section
104(a) of CERCLA gives the President the power to take necessary steps "to
protect the health or welfare or the environment." Id. § 104(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a). The costs of such remedial measures are then made recoverable
under section 107(a)(4)(A). Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(a).
39. Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Section 107(a)(4)(A)
makes responsible parties liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action in-
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107(a)(1), which deals with present owners and operators, has
40
been interpreted as imposing strict liability.
Liability under CERCLA is not premised on who actually
dumped or disposed of the hazardous waste. 4 1 CERCLA also
makes parties liable for clean up costs incurred by private parties,
curred by the United States Government... not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan." Id. This provision gives the EPA the power to go after those
responsible parties who have sufficient funds to reimburse the federal government for cleanup costs. Id. Thus a liable party could be held responsible for the
costs of cleaning up an entire hazardous waste site even if its hazardous waste is
only a fraction of the total amount of hazardous waste on the site. Id. CERCLA,
however, gives liable parties a right of contribution. Id. § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1). Section 113(f)(1) states in part "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section
[l]07(a) of this title ...." Id. A cause of action under section 113()(1) is governed by federal law and the court is given the power to "allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate." Id. However, a suit for contribution against other parties could
very well be an exercise in futility. The EPA will likely have discovered and included in its suit those obviously responsible parties who have available funds
and are easily held liable. The discovery of other more obscure responsible parties could be expensive, and there is no guarantee that once discovered they will
have any funds with which to contribute. Further, assuming such parties could
be found, the task of determining which hazardous substances belong to whom
and what part of the cleanup costs should be apportioned thereto is a very technical, drawn out, difficult, and costly process. SUPERFUND SECTION 301 (e) STUDY
GROUP No.97-12, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES (1982) (report to Congress in compliance
with section 301 (e) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980) [hereinafter SECTION 301(e) STUDY]. In the study,
commissioned by CERCLA section 301(e), 42 U.S.C. § 965 1(e), the study group
pointed out some basic problems in private environmental suits, and although
the study dealt with actions under common law, the procedural and evidentiary
problems tend to be the same: "The identification of proper parties defendant is
a recurring problem because long latency periods (for injuries caused by exposure to hazardous waste], changes of ownership of disposal sites, changes in the
nature of wastes deposited, and multiplicity of exposure may leave liabilities unclear and the choice of defendants uncertain." SECTION 301(e) STUDY at 31.
40. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). The
court in Shore Realty, in rejecting the argument that section 107 requires that
causation must be shown, held that section 107(a)(1) "unequivocally imposes
strict liability." Id. "We note that although the term 'strict' was deleted at the
last minute ... it still appears that Congress intended to impose a strict liability
standard subject only to the affirmative defenses listed in § 107(b)." United
States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) (citation omitted); see
In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
("The liability imposed by section 107(a) of CERCLA is strict liability."). However, no provision explicitly imposing strict liability exists in CERCLA.
41. See In Re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1988). In Milbar the debtor was a corporation whose primary asset was commercial real estate and buildings. Id. The debtor/present owner was forced into
bankruptcy because a former tenant had improperly disposed of hazardous
waste on the property, thus imposing CERCLA liability on the present owner of
the property despite the fact that the debtor/present owner had nothing to do
with the dumping. Id. But in CERCLA section 107(b) there is a narrow excep-
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to the extent that such costs are "consistent with the national contingency plan." 42 Such expansive liability under CERCLA, in ad-

dition to the extreme costliness of cleaning up a hazardous waste
site, can often force a liable individual or company into
43
bankruptcy.
III.

THE MIDLANTIC DECISION

The Supreme Court's decision in Midlantic is an excellent example of the conflict between the Code and state and federal environmental laws. The Midlantic decision dealt with a bankruptcy
trustee's ability to abandon burdensome property of the estate
under section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code 4 4 when the property in
question was in violation of state and federal environmental
laws. 45 Property is generally abandoned when it is worthless,
when it would cost more to clean up than its eventual sale price,
or when it is costing the estate money to maintain and there is no
46
real possibility of a future sale.
The debtor in Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation
(Quanta), operated two waste oil treatment facilities, one in New
York and the other in New Jersey. 4 7 After the discovery at the
tion to section 107(a) liability for parties who are essentially innocent. CERCLA
§ 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) ("innocent landowner defense").
42. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
43. In the Midlantic case, the cleanup ofjust one of the polluted properties
involved cost of $2.5 million. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498. For a discussion of the
costliness of environmental cleanup, see supra note 4. Often when a small company is involved, the cleanup costs of only a small amount of toxic waste, in
combination with the company's debts, can force the company into bankruptcy.
See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re T.P.
Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
44. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494. Section 554 of the Code gives the trustee the
power to "abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate
or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a).
Upon abandonment of the property, the bankruptcy estate's interest terminates,
and title to and interest in the property reverts to the debtor. T.P. Long Chemical,
45 Bankr. at 284-85.
45. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494. By abandoning contaminated property under
section 554 of the Code, a bankruptcy trustee is often endangering the public
health and welfare, thus violating the main purpose of most environmental legislation. See id. at 499 n.3 (abandoned toxic waste oil presented "risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and
injury, genetic damage, or death through personal contact").
46. See In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 Bankr. 994 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (facility
not operational, cost of maintenance was $11,000 a month, no sale could be
consummated), aff'd, 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494. The Midlantic decision thus involved not only
New Jersey laws and governmental agencies, but the laws and governmental
agencies of both the State and the City of New York. Id.
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New Jersey facility of over 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated
with a toxic carcinogen, Quanta filed for bankruptcy in New
Jersey under Chapter 11 of the Code. 48 Oil contaminated with
toxic substances was subsequently found on the New York property.4 9 Unable to find a buyer for the New York property, the
court-appointed trustee gave notice of his intent to abandon the
New York property under section 554 of the Code.5 0 The State
and the City of New York objected to the abandonment, arguing
that it would threaten the public's health and safety in violation of
state and federal environmental laws. 5 ' The Bankruptcy Court
for the District of NewJersey approved the abandonment, and the
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed.5 2
Shortly thereafter the trustees moved to abandon the New Jersey
48. Id. at 497. Subsequent to the bankruptcy filing in New Jersey, 70,000
gallons of contaminated oil were discovered at the New York facility. Id. After
the bankruptcy filing the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP) issued an order requiring Quanta to cleanup the New Jersey site. Id.
About a month after filing under Chapter 11 of the Code Quanta converted its
bankruptcy action to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. Both the New York and New
Jersey facilities were contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls, which are extremely toxic and hazardous chemicals. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912, 913 (3d Cir. 1984). The New York site, further, was located at the geographical center of New York City, posing an obviously serious health risk to a
large number of people. Id.
49. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 498. New York based its argument largely on section 959(b) of
the Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires in part as follows:
(b) [A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in
any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall
manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of
the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that
the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession
thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
Abandonment, argued New York, would be in violation of section 959(b)
since it would violate state and federal environmental laws. Midlantic, 474 U.S.
at 498. New York's case for reversal was helped by the fact that subsequent to
receiving approval to abandon the sites, the trustee halted a 24-hour guard service and turned off the fire suppression system, greatly increasing the risk of
harm to the public. Id. Prior to this time, however, the trustee had personally
borrowed and spent $20,000 on the property, largely on the 24-hour guard service. Cosetti & Friedman; Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs and Penn Terra: The
Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law - Perceived Conflicts and Options for the
Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 U. Pirr. L. & COMM. J. 65, 70 (1987)
(emphasis added). Further, none of the parties involved disputed the fact that
the properties were "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to the estate,"
and thus came under section 554 of the Code. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
52. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498.
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53
property, which was also approved by the bankruptcy court.
This decision and the earlier district court decision were appealed
directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed the bankruptcy and district court decisions,
holding that a bankruptcy trustee did not have the power under
the Code to abandon property of a bankruptcy estate in contra54
vention of state environmental protection laws.
In affirming the Third Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court
found that before the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code any
power a trustee had to abandon property was given to him by the
courts. 55 With the enactment of section 554 of the Code in 1978,
the Court determined that Congress had intended to codify this
judge-made power.5 6 The Court found that since this pre-Code
power to abandon was prohibited by pre-Code courts in circumstances where such abandonment would contravene state police
powers, such a limitation also extended to section 554 of the
Code.5 7 The Court stated the following: "Thus, when Congress
enacted section 554, there were well recognized restrictions on a
trustee's abandonment power. In codifying the judicially developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included
the established corollary that a trustee could not exercise his
abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal
laws." 58
The Supreme Court found additional support for its holding
in Congress' "obvious" concern for the state of the environment,

53. Id.
54. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984). Prior to the
1978 passage of the Bankruptcy Code, any abandonment powers which the
trustee had were created by judge-made law. Id. at 916. The Third Circuit examined this judge-made abandonment power and concluded that Congress intended to codify it in section 554 of the Code. Id. The Quanta court held that
the pre-Code abandonment power was limited by state police powers protecting
the public interest: "[W]here important state law or general equitable principles
protect some public interest, they should not be overridden by federal legislation unless they are inconsistent with explicit congressional intent such that the
supremacy clause mandates their supersession by the abandonment power." Id.
at 918. The court stated that since Congress intended to codify this law in section 554 of the Code, section 554 must be similarly limited. Id.
55. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500.

56. For a discussion of this argument, see supra note 54.
57. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500.

58. Id. at 501. The Midlantic Court also found support in 28 U.S.C. section
959(b), which it used as evidence that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505. The absence
of any Code provision which suggests that a trustee can abandon property in
contravention of state laws further supports this position, held the Court. Id. at
502.
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as evidenced by its recent adoption and stiffening of environmental legislation such as CERCLA. 59 In summary, the Court held
that "a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a
state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect
60
the public health or safety from identifiable hazards."
In an aggressive dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's opinion as being unsupported by the law and contrary to
the goals of the Code. 6' The Court not only misread the preCode case law concerning the abandonment power, argued Justice Rehnquist, but also failed to support its holding that Congress intended to codify that pre-Code case law. 62 Furthermore,
by preventing the abandonment of burdensome property and requiring the trustee to expend assets of the estate to clean up contaminated property, the majority's opinion was in direct conflict
63
with the purposes of the Code.
59. Id. at 506. It is somewhat difficult to understand how the Court could
argue that the 1980 passage of CERCLA evidenced an intent by Congress in
1978 to limit a trustee's abandonment power under the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in Midlantic that section 554 of the Code:
[M]akes no mention of other factors to be balanced or weighed and
permits no easy inference that Congress was concerned about state environmental regulations. Indeed, as the Court notes, when Congress
was so concerned it expressed itself clearly, specifically exempting some
environmental injunctions from the automatic stay provisions of section 362 of the Code.
Id. at 509 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). In a footnote to this holding the Court
stated that this exception to the abandonment power is a "narrow one," and that
"[tihe abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm." Id. at 509 n.9. The Court neglected to give any guidance,
however, as to how to determine which laws are "reasonably designed to protect
the public health or safety," and simply stating that the exception is a "narrow
one" does not make it so. See id. at 516 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
61. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). At one point Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's use of a treatise on bankruptcy in support of
its opinion: "[t]he reference to Collier is not part of the Code's 'legislative history in any meaningful sense of the term.' " Id. at 512 (quoting Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 372 (1986)).
62. Id. at 510-12. Justice Rehnquist argued that in the pre-Code cases cited
by the majority the abandonment power was limited because it was only ajudgemade power, and in those cases abandonment would have been contrary to an
Act of Congress. Id. at 511. Thus, the pre-code cases cited by the majority
stand only for the proposition that as between ajudge-made power and an act of
Congress, the act of Congress must rule. Id. The majority's restriction on abandonment, stated Justice Rehnquist, "rests on a misreading of three pre-code
cases, the elevation of that misreading into a 'well-recognized' exception to the
abandonment power, and the unsupported assertion that Congress must have
meant to codify the exception." Id. at 507-08.
63. Id. at 514-15.
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THE FRAMEWORK FOR PERSONAL LIABILITY OF A
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
Bankruptcy Trustee Liability in General

Before the potential liability of a bankruptcy trustee since the
Midlantic decision can be examined, a basic framework of liability
must first be established. This section will examine bankruptcy
trustee liability generally, and then will discuss bankruptcy trustee
liability with respect to federal and state environmental laws and
Chapters 7 and 11 of the Code.
The standard for liability of a bankruptcy trustee was estab6
lished by the Supreme Court in the case of Mosser v. Darrow. A
The Mosser case subsequently gave rise to a split among the circuits as to the proper standard for bankruptcy trustee liability. 65
The Tenth Circuit in Sherr v. Winkler 6 6 refused to hold a bankruptcy trustee personally liable for negligent acts and interpreted
Mosser as imposing personal liability only where the trustee "acts
67
willfully and deliberately in violation of his fiduciary duties.."
64. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). In Mosser, the bankruptcy trustee was appointed
to reorganize two bankrupt trusts which consisted of two holding companies
holding the securities of twenty-seven corporations. Id. at 268. The trustee employed two persons who had prior experience with the holding companies and
who managed the two holding companies for him. Id. at 269. Further, the two
employees were given permission by the trustee to trade in the securities of the
corporations held by the trust. Id. The two employees, through trading both for
and to themselves and the trusts, made a substantial profit for themselves. Id.
Although the Mosser court stated that there was no indication that the trustee's
actions were corrupt, it nonetheless held him personally liable for the amount of
profits made by the two employees in their self-interested transactions. Id. at
275. The court stated, "[e]quity tolerates in bankruptcy trustees no interest adverse to the trust." Id. at 271.
65. In re Center Teleproductions, Inc., 112 Bankr. 567, 576 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990); see In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 62 Bankr. 213, 217 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1986) (Sixth and Ninth Circuits disagree on whether trustee may be
held responsible for negligent acts).
66. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 1375. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have followed the Tenth
Circuit's reading of Mosser. See Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819
F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1987); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th
Cir. 1982). In truth, the split among the circuits appears to be the result of a
semantical distinction and a misreading of the Mosser case by the Sherr court.
The Sherr court read Mosser as imposing personal liability for willful and deliberate
violations of his duties, and official liability for acts of negligence. Sherr, 552 F.2d
at 1375 (emphasis added). Trustees who were held to be liable in their "official
capacity" were surcharged by the court. Id. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "surcharge" is "[t]he imposition of personal liability on a fiduciary for
willful or negligent misconduct .... " BLAcK's Law DICTIONARY 1441 (6th ed.
1990). Thus, the Tenth Circuit's distinction between "personal" and "official"
liability is for the most part non-existent. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's test for
"official" liability for negligence is the same test other circuits use to impose
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The Ninth Circuit in In re Cochise College Park, Inc. ,68 held, however, that "[a]lthough a trustee is not liable in any manner for
mistakes in judgement where discretion is allowed, he is subject
to personal liability for not only intentional but also negligent violations of duties imposed upon him by law." 6 9 Despite the split
among the circuits, however, a bankruptcy trustee can, in essence,
be personally liable for intentional and negligent violations of his
70
duties under the law.
B.

Trustee Liability Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code

The potential for personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee in
a case involving contaminated property of the estate can arise in a
number of ways under Chapter 7. As previously discussed, a
bankruptcy trustee will be liable for willful or negligent violations
of his duties. 7' There is also the potential for liability under federal legislation such as CERCLA and under state environmental
laws when the property of the estate is polluted with hazardous
waste.
One way potential liability could arise would be where a
Chapter 7 trustee was operating the debtor's business under section 721 of the Code 72 and at the same time generating toxic
waste. Unless the trustee properly disposes of those toxic wastes
general liability on a bankruptcy trustee, namely the "degree of care required of
an ordinarily prudent person serving in such capacity." Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1375.
Further, to the extent that the Sherr court read Mosser as holding that bankruptcy trustees were not personally liable for negligent acts, its reading of that
case was incorrect. Because the trustee in Mosser hired the employees and knew
of their actions, the court did not even reach the question of negligence because
the trustee's actions were intentional. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272. The Mosser court
stated that "[t]he question whether [the trustee] was negligent in not making
detailed inquiries into [the employees] operations is unimportant, because he
had given blanket authority for the operations." Id.
68. 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). The Cochise court stated that a trustee
must "exercise that measure of care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances would exercise." Id. at 1357. The Second
Circuit has adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach. In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723 (2d
Cir. 1985).
70. In re Center Teleproductions, Inc., 112 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("[w]here trustee negligently fails to discover his agent's negligence, negligently obtains a court order, or negligently or willfully carries out a court order
he knew or should have known he wrongfully procured.., personal liability will
attach").
71. For a discussion of the liability of a bankruptcy trustee for willful or
negligent violations of his duties, see supra notes 67 & 69 and accompanying
text.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 721. Under this section of the Code the trustee, with permission of the court, may operate the debtor's business to the extent necessary
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he could face liability under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) 73 and any
other applicable state laws.7 4 But since the Chapter 7 trustee cannot operate the debtor's business without approval of the court,
the extent to which the trustee may be liable will depend on the
extent to which the court authorizes the trustee to generate toxic
75
waste.
Another potential avenue for the personal liability of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was created by the Midlantic decision.
Under Midlantic, the trustee cannot abandon contaminated propto liquidate the business. For a further discussion of a trustee's operation of a
debtor's business, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability on the generators of toxic waste. Id. Bankruptcy trustees will not be liable under sections
107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2), the "owner and operator" sections, because bankruptcy
trustees are exempted from such liability under the CERCLA definition of
"owner and operator." CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). Section 101 (20)(A) states in part: "[tihe term 'owner or operator' means .. .(iii) in
the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy
...to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand." Id.
Thus, in the case of bankruptcy, the trustee presumably is precluded from being
an owner or operator under CERCLA.
In a much more limited sense, where the Chapter 7 trustee is running a
transportation, storage or disposal site for hazardous waste, the trustee could be
liable under CERCLA section 107(a)(4), which imposes liability on anyone who
transports, stores or treats hazardous waste improperly. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
74. Under section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, a federally appointed
trustee must "manage and operate the property in his possession... according
to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to
do if in possession thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). Thus, if the trustee does not
comply with applicable state hazardous waste statutes, he would be in violation
of his duties as a trustee and subject to personal liability. See Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
75. It is doubtful that a court would hold a trustee personally liable for
generating hazardous substances where the bankruptcy court authorized him to
do so. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, 466 N.W.2d 239. At the same time, a
trustee generating waste without permission from the court would certainly
seem to be subject to personal liability both under CERCLA and under the common law for willful or negligent violation of his duties.
Further, one could question the ability of a bankruptcy court to authorize a
trustee to generate hazardous wastes. Such an event would seem to contradict
the purposes of CERCLA. This is but one more example of the clash between
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. On one hand one can question whether a
bankruptcy court should be able to authorize a trustee to generate hazardous
waste, but on the other hand not allowing a court to do so would impair the
functioning of the bankruptcy system. Further complicating matters is the operation of section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, which requires the trustee to operate the debtor's business in compliance with applicable state law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b). Thus to some extent the trustee can only generate hazardous wastes
to the extent that he can do so under state law. See In re Better-Brite Plating,
Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989).
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erty unless it is in compliance with state environmental laws. 76 In
a situation where the Chapter 7 estate has no available funds with
which to clean up contaminated property, 77 the estate will be prohibited from abandoning such property and the trustee may be
held responsible for the cleanup of the hazardous waste. 78 Because the cost of cleanup can be great, many companies expend a
large part, or all, of their assets on cleanup prior to the case
reaching Chapter 7; therefore, in many instances, the appointed
trustee is left with little, or no, assets. 79 Coupled with the Midlantic limitation on abandonment of burdensome property of the estate, this costliness creates a situation where a court may well
impose personal liability on a bankruptcy trustee-that is, where
the Chapter 7 estate has little or no unencumbered assets and is
saddled with property contaminated with hazardous wastes which
76. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
77. Before a bankruptcy trustee will become personally liable, the Chapter
7 estate must have no available source for funds with which to effect a clean up
of the contaminated property. This would mean that the estate must have no
unencumbered assets and, further, no uncontaminated assets subject to a security interest. If there were uncontaminated secured assets, the trustee could potentially use them as a source of funds under Bankruptcy Code section 363(e)
and thus could avoid personal liability. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). Section 363 states
as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased,
or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with
or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease
as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.
Id.
To use the secured assets, the trustee must be able to provide adequate
protection for the secured party. Id. What constitutes "adequate protection" is
to be determined by the court, but examples thereof are given in section 361.
11 U.S.C. § 361. However, to provide "adequate protection" to a secured party
will most likely require that the trustee have some asset of value. Thus, in a
Chapter 7 case where unencumbered assets are being consumed to cleanup contaminated property of the estate, chances are that when the trustee is forced to
attempt to use secured assets as a source of funds for cleanup there will be no
uncontaminated assets with which to provide adequate protection.
78. See, e.g., In re Microfab, Inc., 105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In
re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). For a discussion
of this potential for personal liability, see infra notes 92-121 and accompanying
text.
79. See In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988) (bankruptcy
case converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 with no unencumbered assets); In
re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 214 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The
debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition ... having exhausted its liquid assets
in litigation concerning pollution . . . of the debtor's only substantial asset").
There is also the case where the only asset of the debtor is contaminated property, and even worse, where the only asset is contaminated property and the net
value of the property clean is less than the cost of cleanup. Id.
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the trustee cannot abandon. 80
C.

Trustee Liability Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Code
The situation in a Chapter 11 proceeding presents a different
scenario than under Chapter 7. In a Chapter 11 proceeding the
bankruptcy trustee 8 ' does not need the approval of the court to
operate the debtor's business. 8 2 Thus, if the trustee in the operation of the debtor's business generates hazardous wastes, the
trustee will be subject to potential liability under CERCLA section 107(a)(3). 8 3 Unlike the Chapter 7 scenario, however, the
Chapter 11 trustee will not be able to rely on the bankruptcy
court's authorization to generate hazardous waste as a defense
against personal liability. 84 If the debtor's business entails the
generation of hazardous waste, the trustee is likely to run afoul of
the CERCLA generator liability provision. Therefore, unless a
Chapter 11 trustee can properly dispose of hazardous waste, the

trustee generates and transports hazardous waste at his or her
own risk.
Unlike a Chapter 7 proceeding, Midlantic liability is much
more limited under Chapter 11. If the estate is capable of remaining in Chapter 11, it necessarily has enough funds to remain
operational. 85 Thus the trustee will most likely have a source of
80. It must be stressed that the estate in this scenario does not have an
alternative source of funds for cleanup. The different possible sources of funds
are many: the estate may be able to impose liability on the shareholders of a
bankrupt corporation by "piercing the corporate veil" under state law; the
debtor, though liable under CERCLA, may be able to sue other parties liable
under CERCLA for contribution under CERCLA section 113(0, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f); the debtor may be able to draw on any uncontaminated, but secured,
assets. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
81. In the normal Chapter 11 case, the debtor retains possession of its
property and the management and control functions of that property. See 11
U.S.C. § 1107. A Chapter 11 trustee is appointed only on request of a "party in
interest or the United States Trustee," and only for cause or if the appointment
is "in the interests of creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 1104. Thus, in the normal course
of a Chapter 11 proceeding, a trustee generally will not be appointed.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1108. Section 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code states as follows: "[u]nless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business." Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). For the text of section 107(a)(3), see supra note
36.
84. Without the approval of the bankruptcy court, the Chapter 11 trustee
could also be liable under section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, for not operating the debtor's business in compliance with state laws. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
The trustee presumably would also be liable under Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S.
267 (1951), for willful violation of his duties.
85. If a debtor did not have a source of funds with which to operate its
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funds with which to effect the cleanup, or at least the maintenance
of, the contaminated property. If the estate did not have sufficient funds to remain operational, the proceeding would in all
likelihood be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation under section
1112 of the Code. 86 The conversion of a Chapter 11 proceeding
to Chapter 7 "terminates the service of any trustee or examiner
that is serving in the case before such conversion." 8 7 The Chapter 11 trustee would be potentially liable due to the Midlantic decision in a situation where there are not sufficient funds to maintain
a Chapter 11 proceeding or to maintain a contaminated property,8 8 and where the Chapter 11 proceeding is not being converted or is taking a long time to convert. 8 9 In such a situation,
the responsibility of maintaining the contaminated property could
fall upon the Chapter 11 trustee. 90 Thus, in Chapter 11, the
business, it is most likely that the case would be converted under section 1112 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1112. For a discussion of conversion under
section 1112, see infra note 86.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1112. Section 1112 of the Code allows the debtor or a
party in interest to request the conversion of the proceeding to Chapter 7. Id.
Section 1112(b) states that a party in interest or the United States Trustee may
request conversion to Chapter 7 for cause, including, among other reasons: "(1)
continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation; (2) inability to effectuate a plan; (3) unreasonable delay
" Id. If the estate had a
by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; ....
contaminated asset, the liability from which made it unlikely that a reorganization would be successful, rather than needlessly wasting the assets of the estate,
or in order to protect secured assets, the creditors of the estate would most
likely request a conversion.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 348. Therefore, once a proceeding is converted to Chapter
7, any personal liability of the Chapter 11 trustee under Midlantic would be cut
off. Id. Liability for negligent or willful acts committed before conversion, however, would still exist.
88. For a discussion of the Midlantic duty to maintain, see infra notes 122-29
and accompanying text.
89. At least two parties would desire to see a bankruptcy proceeding in this
scenario remain in Chapter 11, the debtor and the secured creditor of the contaminated property. As long as the proceeding remains in Chapter 11, the
debtor and the secured creditor of the contaminated party are benefited because
there is a larger source of funds from which to draw on in Chapter 11, thus
making it more likely that the property will be cleaned up and their ultimate
liability avoided.
For the purposes of this Comment, the liability of a party with a secured
interest in contaminated property will not be addressed, as the discussion of
such liability is beyond the scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say that such
liability is possible. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573
(D. Md. 1986).
90. The costs of maintaining a contaminated property can be quite high.
As in the Chapter 7 scenario, for the trustee to be personally liable the estate
must have no alternative source of funds with which to maintain the property.
Because of the nature of Chapter 11 and the powers of the Chapter 11 trustee, it
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Midlantic duty to maintain the property is a trap which could impose personal liability on the unwary trustee. Such liability would
be short-lived, however, because the trustee as a party in interest
could always petition the court for a conversion of the proceeding
to Chapter 7.91
V.
A.

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF A BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
Liability Following the Midlantic Decision

In the case of In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc. ,92 the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of New York recognized that as a
result of the Midlantic decision there was the potential for personal liability of a Chapter 7 trustee. 93 The debtor in Milbar was a
corporation whose primary asset was a piece of real estate polluted with toxic wastes. 9 4 The case came before the bankruptcy
court on a motion by the debtor corporation's trustee to either
dismiss the case pursuant to section 305 of the Code, or to authorize the abandonment of all of the debtor's assets. 9 5 After refusing to dismiss the case under section 305, the Milbar court
reviewed the Midlantic decision and pointed out a basic flaw in
that decision:
The holding in Midlantic implies a duty on the part of the
trustee which is independent of the estate's ability to
would be admittedly uncommon for this scenario to arise. For a discussion of
the Midlantic duty to maintain, see infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of the conversion of a bankruptcy proceeding from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92. 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
93. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 219. Since the Midlantic Court did not deal specifically with the potential for personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee, such liability could be imposed by implication from the Midlantic holding. See In re BetterBrite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re Microfab, Inc.,
105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
94. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 214. In Milbar, the debtor's prior tenant had generated and disposed of toxic waste on the properties in question, thus contarninating them. Id. Originally the debtor and its prior tenant had an agreement
whereby the prior tenant had agreed to cleanup the site. Id. However, the prior
tenant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and never performed the agreement. Id. The debtor then expended all its liquid assets in litigation concerning
the site and subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Id.
95. Id. Section 305(a) of the Code states in part: "The court, after notice
and hearing, may dismiss a case under this title ... at any time if- (1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal." 11
U.S.C. § 305(a). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concurred in the
trustee's motion to dismiss the case. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 214. The debtor, however, did not. Id.
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fund his performance of that duty. This decision, evaluated in conjunction with (i) the trustee's capacity to "sue
and be sued," and (ii) federal, state and local environmental regulations which do not limit the liability of a
trustee in bankruptcy, threatens to undermine the integrity of the system heretofore developed for the adminis96
tration of bankruptcy cases.
The Milbar court was concerned that this potential personal
liability would discourage people from becoming bankruptcy
trustees.9 7 In what was apparently an attempt to provide some
protection for a trustee, the court held that the existence of polluted assets in the bankruptcy estate which "present a reasonable
risk of liability to the trustee pursuant to environmental legislation may constitute acceptable cause for resignation of a
trustee. ' ' 98 Taking an approach deemed novel by the court, possessory interest in the polluted property was transferred to the
EPA while legal title to the property remained in the bankruptcy
estate.9 9 Transference of the possessory interest accomplished
two goals in the court's mind: "(i) the EPA will be in a position to
carry out its mandate under ... CERCLA and (ii) the successor
trustee is distanced (but, it is arguable, not insulated entirely)
from potential liability under applicable environmental legislation." 10 0 The court stated that it would effect such a transfer by
96. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 218.
97. Id. at 219. So concerned was the Milbar court that it would become
difficult to find trustees that it held that the mere presence of a polluted asset
was not sufficient cause to dismiss the case under section 707 of the Code. Id.
The inability to find a person willing to act as trustee, however, would be cause
for such dismissal. Id. Under section 707 of the Code, the court is empowered
to dismiss a Chapter 7 proceeding only "for cause." 11 U.S.C. § 707. The
Milbar court held that should the trustee in that case resign, the failure to find an
interim or successor trustee within thirty days of the court's opinion would constitute "cause" for dismissal under section 707. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 214.
98. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 222.

99. Id. at 214. Title to the polluted property was ordered to be kept in the
bankruptcy estate with the intention that after cleanup the property would be
sold and the proceeds distributed to the creditors of the estate. Id. at 220. The
Milbar court also felt that its order would not favor the EPA over other creditors

of the estate, which would ensure that the cleaned up property would be "sold
for the highest possible price." Id.
100. Id. (footnote omitted). Abandonment, reasoned the court, would not
accomplish anything since title to the property would revert to the debtor, who
did not have sufficient funds to cleanup the site. Id. In the end the Milbar court

issued an order which did the following: (1) transferred possessory interest to
the EPA subject to three conditions: first that the EPA accept such possessory
interest; second that a successor trustee is found; and third that an agreement is
reached between the EPA, the successor trustee and the debtor as to when and
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issuing an order "pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 725."lo0 Although the
court refused to dismiss the case outright, it treated the trustee's
motion to dismiss as a motion for resignation and allowed the
02
trustee to resign.
Similarly, in the case of In re Microfab, Inc. ,to3 the bankruptcy
court interpreted the Midlantic decision as imposing the potential
for personal liability on a trustee.' 0 4 In Microfab, the State of Massachusetts sought an injunction to force the Chapter 7 trustee to
cleanup polluted property of the estate.' 0 5 The estate had insufficient funds, however, to cleanup the site. 10 6 The Microfab court
addressed two issues: (1) whether Midlantic required the trustee
to cleanup the site; and (2) whether the trustee would have an
administrative claim against the estate if required to spend his or

°7
her own money in cleaning up any of its contaminated assets.1

under what circumstances possessory interest in the property would re-vest in
the estate; (2) allowed the present trustee to resign; and (3) provided for dismissal of the case under section 707 should a successor trustee not be found. Id. at
214.
101. Id. The court's use of section 725 was tenuous at best, since section
725 states in part: "[A]fter the commencement of a case under this chapter...
the trustee, after notice and hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an
entity other than the estate has an interest ...and that has not been disposed of
under another section of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 725 (emphasis added). The
court acknowledged that its use of section 725 in this manner was "novel," but
opined that it was within Congress' intent to give bankruptcy courts flexible
powers with which to "meet special circumstances." Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 220.
102. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 214. The Milbar court refused to dismiss the case
outright under section 305 of the Code. Id. The court did provide that the
failure to find a successor trustee within 30 days of the court's decision would be
grounds for dismissal of the bankruptcy petition under section 707(a) of the
Code. Id.
103. 105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
104. Id. at 168.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. at 164. Although the estate had $750,000 of unencumbered cash,
the estimated cost of cleaning up the property was between $1.6 and $1.9 million. Id. The Microfab court saw this situation as a "stalemate," since the State
refused to cleanup the site and the estate had insufficient funds to do so. Id.
Further, the court saw the State as complicating matters since the State also
refused to say that should the trustee exhaust the $750,000 in cleaning up the
property, it would provide the funds to finish the job. Id.
107. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at 165. The Microfab court framed the first issue
as being whether section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), or
the Midlantic decision required the trustee to cleanup the site. Microfab, 105
Bankr. at 165. The second issue the court saw was whether, if the trustee expended funds to cleanup the estate, he would be entitled to an administrative
expense claim. Id.
Traditionally, courts have provided administrative expense claims for the
EPA or states which cleanup the polluted property of a bankruptcy debtor. E.g.,
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Stevens,
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The court held that the Midlantic decision precluded a trustee
from abandoning polluted assets of the estate without first meeting certain federal and state environmental law conditions. In
ruling that a trustee would have an administrative claim for
amounts personally expended for the cleanup of contaminated
assets, the court stated that "Midlantic does not clearly define
those conditions, but the cases agree that if the Trustee cannot
abandon property without satisfying certain conditions, neithercan
he maintain or possess it without satisfying them, and the cost of satisfy08
ing the conditions are administrative expenses of the estate."'
The Microfab court, however, avoided imposing liability on the
trustee by reading an exception into the Midlantic decision. The
court stated that a trustee need not expend assets of the estate to
cleanup a site where the estate "does not have sufficient resources
to achieve appreciable results."' 0 9 In essence, the exception delineated by the court relieved the trustee of the responsibility of
blindly expending all personal and estate assets in a futile cleanup
effort. "10
Another line of cases, represented by In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc.,"' has refused to impose the Midlantic duty to cleanup polluted assets before abandonment where the estate does not have
68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). The clear implication of this is that the
Microfab court was considering whether the trustee personally should have to
cleanup the estate, since it was the trustee, under the second issue, who would
receive the administrative expense claim. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at 165. Clearly,
the court was not considering whether the estate should have to clean up the
site, since it is foolish to consider whether the estate could have an administrative expense claim against itself.
108. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at 168 (emphasis added). This is in essence the
quandary created by the Midlantic decision, a duty to cleanup with no means to
do so. See In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 Bankr. 339, 342 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989)
(referring to paradox that Midlantic requires cleanup but fails to identify viable
funding source). In light of the issues framed, the court in Microfab clearly considered that the trustee was in a position to be personally liable for the Midlantic
conditions-that is cleanup of the polluted property. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at
168-69.
109. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at 166. In essence, the court here was abrogating
not only the trustee's liability under Midlantic, but the estate's liability as well.
Id. at 169. "I cannot order the Trustee to spend the estate's funds without some
assurance that by doing so, he would significantly improve the condition of the
site." Id. But see In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 948-49 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1987) ("As the estate could not avoid the consequent liability by abandonment in this case, the Trustee had a duty to expend all unencumbered assets of
the estate in remedying the situation, as required by Midlantic"). In keeping with
the Milbar tradition, the exception which the Microfab court read into Midlantic is
best described as "novel."
110. Microfab, 105 Bankr. at 166.
111. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
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any unencumbered assets. "1 2 In Smith-Douglass, the Fourth Circuit
approved the abandonment of polluted assets based on the fact
that the estate had no unencumbered assets with which to effect a
cleanup of the property." 13 The financial condition of the debtor,
the Smith-Douglass court held, is relevant to the Midlantic
4
analysis. "1
Another way of dealing with the problem of a trustee's potential for personal liability is to deny that the potential exists, as
evidenced by the ongoing bankruptcy case of In re Hemingway
Transport, Inc. 115 Starting in 1987, there have been three separate
hearings, and in all three subsequent opinions, the Hemingway
court dealt with the subject of potential liability of a trustee by
squarely ignoring it.' 16 In the Hemingway case, contaminated
property was sold while the case was under Chapter 11,1"7 and
the case was subsequently converted to Chapter 7.'18 In the first
Hemingway case, the trustee was personally sued by the purchaser
as a potentially liable party under CERCLA for past and future
cleanup costs.' '9 The Hemingway court ruled that while it was
proper to bring suit against the trustee in his capacity as representative of the estate, the purchaser's claim was against the estate
112. Id. at 17; In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912, 917 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1989); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 948-49 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1987).
113. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 17.
114. Id. at 17. Another consideration for the Smith-Douglass court was that
the polluted property did not pose a serious health risk: "We affirm the finding
that unconditional abandonment was appropriate in light of the estate's lack of
unencumbered assets, coupled with the absence of serious public health risks
posed by the conditions in this case." Id. To the extent that Smith-Douglass did
not deal with a situation in which there was a serious threat to the public health
and safety, its application in these types of bankruptcy cases is limited.
115. 108 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (Hemingway III); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 105 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (Hemingway II); In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (Hemingway I).
116. Hemingway Ill, 108 Bankr. 378; Hemingway 1I, 105 Bankr. 171; Hemingway I, 73 Bankr. 494.
117. Hemingway I, 73 Bankr. at 496. The Hemingway I court somewhat cryptically noted that the trustee was not involved in the sale of the property while
the case was in Chapter 11, leading to the question of how the Court's ruling
would have been affected if the trustee had sold the property originally. Id. at
499; see In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94 Bankr. 924 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1989).
118. Hemingway I, 73 Bankr. at 496. The Code, with certain exceptions and
when certain conditions are met, allows for the conversion of a case under one
chapter into a case under another chapter. 11 U.S.C. §§ 348, 706, 1112, 1208,
1307. Under Chapter 11 of the Code, a debtor in possession or a party in interest may request that the petition be converted into another chapter. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112.
119. Hemingway 1, 73 Bankr. at 496.
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since a bankruptcy trustee never has actual ownership of estate
property. 120 In the two subsequent cases, the Hemingway court
used the term "trustee" to refer to the bankruptcy estate, and
treated any suit naming the trustee as a defendant as a suit against
21
the estate, not a suit against the trustee personally.'
B.

The Midlantic Duty to Maintain

Some courts have read the Midlantic decision to require, at
the very least, that a trustee take certain measures to maintain the
polluted property of an estate in order to protect the public
health and safety.
In the case of In re Franklin Signal Corp. ,122 a Chapter 7 trustee
sought to abandon drums containing hazardous waste.' 2 3 In its
interpretation of the Midlantic decision, the Franklin Signal court
held that a trustee was precluded from abandoning polluted
property unless the trustee took steps to protect the public health
and safety.' 24 The Franklin Signal court asserted that the Midlantic
120. Id. at 499. The Hemingway I court based its ruling in large part on the
pre-Midlantic decision of In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985). To the extent that T.P. Long was decided before Midlantic, its use
with regards to the potential liability of a trustee is suspect. In fact, the T.P. Long
court saw the issue in that case as whether "the trustee's authority to abandon
burdensome property of the estate may be used in any way to avoid the estate's
liability under CERCLA." T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 284. Since there is no doubt
that the Midlantic decision changed the law with regards to the trustee's ability to
abandon, the Long decision's application to environmental liability cases is necessarily limited.
121. Hemingway III, 108 Bankr. 378; Hemingway H, 105 Bankr. 171; Hemingway I, 73 Bankr. 494. In Hemingway III, the court stated that in order to win its
CERCLA cause of action against the trustee, Juniper must have shown that the
trustee owned or operated the property under the CERCLA section 17(a)(2).
Hemingway III, 108 Bankr. at 381. Shortly thereafter, the court held that "the
Trustee's liability to Juniper turns on whether Hemingway owned or operated
the property 'at the time of disposal' of 'hazardous substances.' " Id. The Hemingway III court thus dealt with the problem of personal trustee liability by refusing to distinguish between the term "trustee" and the term "bankruptcy estate."
Id.; see also Hemingway 11, 105 Bankr. 171; Hemingway I, 73 Bankr. 494. While this
is a technically correct way of treating suits against the trustee of a bankruptcy
estate, in light of the Midlantic decision and the recognition by other courts of a
potential for personal liability of a trustee, simply ignoring the problem will not
make it go away.
122. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
123. Id. In Franklin Signal, the debtor had generated fourteen drums of
chemical waste, at least one of which was considered "hazardous" under Wisconsin environmental laws. Id. at 269. The bankruptcy estate had $10,000 in
unencumbered cash, but was saddled with at least $17,000 worth of administrative expenses. Id. at 270. The estimated cost of properly disposing of the
drums, which were reported to be in fair to poor condition, was $20,000. Id.
124. Id. at 271. The court in Franklin Signal noted the Supreme Court's
emphasis in Midlantic on the extremely hazardous situation created by the
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decision "imposes a duty on the trustee to take at least minimal
' 25
steps to protect the public until abandonment is authorized."'
While the Franklin Signal decision lessened the trustee's potential
liability, it did not solve the dilemma faced by the trustee of an
estate with no unencumbered assets, who has no other option but
to use his personal assets to take the "minimal steps" required to
protect the public from any asset in the bankruptcy estate contam26
inated by hazardous waste.'
The Milbar court also read the Midlantic decision as requiring,
127
at the very least, that a trustee take steps to protect the public.
The court found, however, that the Midlantic decision did not provide a trustee with the means necessary for complying with
applicable environmental legislation, "or at a minimum, take precautions to safeguard the public absent funds in the estate to do
SO."128

While reading Midlantic as imposing a duty on a trustee only
to maintain polluted property lessens the potential for personal
liability of that trustee, the amount of money required to maintain
29
a waste site is often beyond a trustee's means.'
trustee's abandonment of the polluted property. Id.; see Midlantic, 474 U.S. at
499 n.3. The Franklin Signal court stated that "this total disregard for potential
hazards is the concern the majority [in Midlantic] seemed to be addressing."
Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 271.
125. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 273; see In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91
Bankr. 213, 218 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (abandonment order permitted only
when public health, safety, and welfare have been provided for); In re Oklahoma
Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (trustee could be
required to comply with state environmental laws' strict reading of Midlantic).
But see In re Microfab, Inc., 105 Bankr. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) ("[T]he
trustee cannot be ordered to comply with a cleanup obligation that he does not
have the financial resources to satisfy").
126. See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986);
In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). In Franklin Signal, the court held that the trustee had complied with the "minimum conditions for abandonment" under Midlantic by hiring an environmental specialist
to determine what was in the drums and how much it would cost to cleanup.
FranklinSignal, 65 Bankr. at 273. Adding to these "minimal steps" the fact that
the drums were not a serious threat to the public health and safety, the Franklin
Signal court found that abandonment of the drums was allowable. Id. at 273.
127. Milbar, 91 Bankr. at 218.
128. Id. Although the primary emphasis of the Milbar decision was on the
potential liability of the trustee for the total costs of cleanup, the court recognized in this instance that a minimum duty to protect the public is due under
Midlantic. Id.
129. In Midlantic, the trustee prior to abandonment personally borrowed
and spent $20,000 on the maintenance of the polluted property. Cosetti &
Friedman, supra note 51, at 70. In In re Stevens, the Maine Department of Environmental Protection, in a letter to the Chapter 7 trustee, said that twenty-nine
drums of toxic waste were improperly stored and had to be placed in a storage
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Trustee Liability Under State Environmental Law

Trustee liability under state environmental laws may differ
from state to state, depending on the nature of the law involved.' 30 But since Midlantic now prevents trustees from abandoning contaminated property of an estate, bankruptcy trustees
must now be aware of potential state liability as well as potential
CERCLA liability.
The plight of the Better-Brite Plating, Inc., which involved
both the Bankruptcy Court and the state courts in Wisconsin on
both the trial and appellate levels, is indicative of the trouble a
bankruptcy trustee can face under state environmental statutes.'1' Better-Brite had been operating chrome and zinc plating
shops in DePere, Wisconsin, since 1963.132 The chrome plating
shop had been in violation of Wisconsin environmental law since
1978, and the zinc plating shop was discharging untreated waste
water into the city sewer system.' 3 3 In September 1985, BetterBrite-which had been losing money for at least two years, was
the subject of a replevin action by its bank, and owed priority
state and federal tax liabilities amounting to $269,756-filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.134 An examiner was subsequently
area that has "an adequate roof and walls to protect the drums from rain." In re
Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 775 n.1 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). "Further an adequate
floor with a 6" curbing must be provided, the floor must be of an impervious
material with no cracks or drains, and it must be capable of containing 25 percent of the liquid volume in the drums." Id. Clearly, the cost of constructing
such a temporary storage facility would be a heavy burden for a trustee to carry
personally.
130. A survey of state environmental laws is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
131. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1989); Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
132. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 914. Further, Better-Brite
Plating had previously operated a chrome plating shop on leased property in
Kaukauna, Wisconsin. Id. The lease for this property had run out some time
before September, 1985. Id.
133. Id. The chrome plating shop used chromic acid in its operation, while
the zinc plating shop used a zinc/cyanide bath solution in its operation. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276 (Cir. Ct. Brown CountyJune 1,
1990).
134. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 912. Better-Brite filed for
bankruptcy on September 5, 1985. Id. John Zenner was familiar with the
debtor's plating business, and was appointed by the bankruptcy court to manage
Better-Brite as an examiner with the powers of a trustee. Wisconsin v. BetterBrite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1, 1990). In
early September, 1985, Better-Brite shut down its chrome plating shop in DePere, and moved it to Kaukauna, Wisconsin, which is not in the same county as
DePere. Id. Because this shop was in a different county, its operation during the
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appointed. While the case was in Chapter 11, the debtor, under
the management of the examiner, continued to operate its zinc
and chrome plating businesses, generating additional post-bankruptcy petition toxic wastes.' 3 5 On August 27, 1986, the Chapter
I1 proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and a
new trustee was appointed. 3 6 During numerous bankruptcy
court proceedings the Chapter 7 estate continued to operate the
zinc shop and to generate and accumulate additional toxic
waste.' 3 7 Eventually the trustee petitioned the bankruptcy court
Chapter 11 proceeding was not called into question in the case concerning the
shops operated in DePere. Id. However, the Kaukauna shop did continue to
operate and generate toxic wastes during the Chapter I1 proceeding. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 915.
135. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 915. The examiner operated the debtor's zinc plating shop between September 16, 1985, and July 14,
1986. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276, slip op. at 3 (Cir.
Ct. Brown County June 1, 1990). Between May, 1986 and July, 1986, the zinc
shop generated and accumulated "approximately twenty full or partially filled
fifty-five gallon barrels of sludge waste .... ." Id. at 4. The wastes generated
were toxic wastes under Wisconsin statutes. Id. Although the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had filed a suit in state court in 1980
seeking forfeitures and cease and desist orders against the DePere chrome shop,
that suit was still pending at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 proceeding.
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 915. Shortly after the filing of the
Chapter 11 proceeding, the DNR instituted another state court suit concerning
the zinc shop. Id. Cease and desist orders in that suit were issued in May, 1986.
Id. The Chapter 11 examiner continued to operate and generate hazardous
wastes after these orders, and contempt orders were issued in July, 1986. Id.
136. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 915. The trustee's position
was not good: "The trustee had only a few hundred dollars, with all other assets
subject to valid encumbrances. His options were an abandonment, or a sale with
the agreement of the bank, but the real estate at the chrome and zinc shops was
unsalable." Id. The trustee was David J. Matyas. Id.
137. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., Ch. 7 Case No. 85-03325, slip op. at 1421 (D. Wis. Sept. 22, 1989). While the Chapter 7 trustee Matyas and the bank
were discussing a possible sale of the debtor's assets, the zinc shop was still
being operated by the previous Chapter 11 examiner, Zenner. Id. at 15. On
September 8, 1986, the bankruptcy court granted Matyas the authority to continue operating the debtor's business while discussions with the bank continued,
however such authority was not extended past September 11. Id. The bankruptcy court stated the following: "It was the trustee's understanding that the
business was being operated in compliance with restrictions placed on the
debtor concerning the discharge of hazardous waste and that it was producing
sufficient revenue to pay the expenses of such operation." Id. According to the
Wisconsin state trial court, the Chapter 7 trustee Matyas authorized Zenner to
operate the zinc shop and generate and accumulate toxic waste until December
18, 1986, when a sale of the debtor's business occurred. Wisconsin v. BetterBrite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276, slip op. at 5 (Cir. Ct. Brown CountyJune 1,
1990). Eventually a sale of the debtor's estate was agreed on. Id. at 6. According to the terms of the sale, a corporation set up by Zenner would purchase the
personal property of the estate with funding from the bank which held mortgages or security interests on all estate property. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc.,
Ch. 7 Case No. 85-03325, slip op. at 20 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 1989). The polluted
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for the authority to abandon the contaminated property of the
estate. 3 8 After the bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to abandon the contaminated property of the estate, 3 9 an action was
brought in the Wisconsin state court to impose personal liability
40
on .the bankruptcy trustee under state environmental laws.'
The trial court subsequently found in Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating Inc.141 that both Zenner, as the Chapter 11 examiner, and
Matyas as the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, violated Wisconsin
law and accordingly granted summary judgment for the state on
the issue of their personal liability for the waste generated and
42
stored during the bankruptcy period.
real estate was not included in this sale. Id. The chrome and zinc shop property
was then leased to another corporation set up by Zenner for a nominal sum. Id.
The basic idea was that Zenner would use the two newly formed corporations to
effect a cleanup of the contaminated real estate. Id.
138. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 915. The trustee filed the
notice of his intent to abandon the contaminated property on March 19, 1987.
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., Ch. 7 Case No. 85-03325, slip op. at 21 (E.D. Wis.
Sept. 22, 1989). Various hearings and objections by the parties involved (including the DNR and the Environmental Protection Agency) consumed another
two and a half years, and it was not until September, 1989 that the bankruptcy
court approved abandonment of the contaminated property. In re Better-Brite
Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 919. Zenner's attempts at cleanup had been largely
unsuccessful to that point. Id. at 915. Further, Zenner and the corporation he
set up to run the zinc shop apparently discharged hazardous liquids from the
zinc shop property sometime prior to July 26, 1988. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite
Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276, slip op. at 8 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1,
1990). No one notified the DNR of the discharge, which was "to the lands
and/or waters of the State," until the spill was discovered by DNR employees
during an inspection of the zinc shop property. Id. Although the property was
leased to Zenner's corporation, the spill occurred before the abandonment of
the contaminated property; therefore, the zinc shop property was still the property of the bankruptcy estate.
139. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. at 919. The bankruptcy court
allowed abandonment of the contaminated property, but ordered that such
abandonment was subject to super-priority liens held by the state of Wisconsin
and the EPA. Id. Such super-priority liens were "superior to any other lien or
interest," entitling the EPA and the state of Wisconsin to the proceeds of any
future sale of the property in question. Id.
140. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276 (Cir. Ct.
Brown County June 1, 1990). For a discussion of the Wisconsin statutes involved, see infra note 141.
141. No. 88-CV-2276 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1, 1990).
142. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276, slip op. at 14
(Cir. Ct. Brown CountyJune 1, 1990). There seems to be little doubt that both
Zenner and Matyas violated Wisconsin environmental statutes in their handling
of the hazardous wastes on the estate property. Under Wisconsin law, hazardous waste was generated at the site. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43(2), 144.62(2)(b)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990). Further, section 144.63 states in part:
Any person generating solid waste shall determine if the solid waste is a
hazardous waste. Any person generating hazardous waste shall:
(1) Be responsible for testing programs needed to determine whether
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In a recent decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the
trial court's grant of summary judgment against the bankruptcy
trustee was reversed and remanded on the grounds that questions
of fact still existed with regards to the trustee's personal liability.14 3 The Wisconsin Appeals Court, adopting the Tenth Cirany material generated by them is a hazardous waste for purposes
of ss. 144.60 to 144.74.
(2) Keep records that accurately identify:
(a) The quantities of hazardous waste generated;
(b) The hazardous constituents of hazardous wastes which are significant because of quantity or potential harmfulness to human
health or the environment; and
(c) The disposition of hazardous wastes.
(3) Label any container used for the storage, transport or disposal of
hazardous waste to accurately identify its contents and associated
hazards.
(9) Arrange that all wastes generated by them are transported, treated,
stored or disposed of at facilities holding a license issued under ss.
144.60 to 144.74 or issued under the resource conservation and
recovery act.
Id. § 144.63.
Apparently neither Zenner nor Matyas had complied with any of the provisions of this statute, including the period after the December 1986 sale of most
of the debtor's property. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV2276 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1, 1990). Zenner and Matyas apparently also
violated section 144.64(2) (am), which prohibits the operation of unlicensed hazardous waste facilities, although generators of hazardous waste who store the
waste at the generation site for less than 90 days are exempted from this section.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.64(2)(am).
Clearly, the waste generated by Zenner in
1986 was stored at the zinc shop site much longer than 90 days, as was the waste
generated during the Chapter 7 proceeding in 1986 and beyond. Wisconsin v.
Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV-2276 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1,
1990). Further, Wisconsin statutes require that persons who possess or control
hazardous wastes notify the DNR of any discharge of those wastes, and "take the
actions necessary to restore the environment ... and minimize the harmful effects of the discharge ...." WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.76(2)(a), (3). As previously
noted, no one notified the DNR of the 1988 spill of hazardous wastes, nor took
any action to clean it up. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., No. 88-CV2276, slip op. at 8 (Cir. Ct. Brown County June 1, 1990).
In its order the trial court granted summary judgment for Wisconsin on the
liability of the following parties: Better-Brite, Matyas, Zenner, and the two corporations set up by Zenner through the December 1986 sale of most of the
debtor's assets (the corporations were "The Zinc Shop, Inc.," and "The Platers,
Inc.") Id. at 14. One of the trial court's findings of fact was that Zenner and
Matyas, in their capacity as bankruptcy trustees "may be held personally liable
for willful, intentional or negligent violations of the State's laws and regulations
during their operation of Better-Brite's zinc plating facility. Id. at 12. As support for this assertion the trial court cited Mosser v. Darrow and In re Cochise College
Park, Inc., adopting the Ninth Circuit test for bankruptcy trustee liability. For a
discussion of the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee generally, see supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
143. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
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cuit's test from Sherr,144 which precludes liability for
negligence, 4 5 ruled that the bankruptcy trustee could be liable
under the applicable Wisconsin statutes only if it was determined
that the trustee "knowingly and intentionally failed" to get a state
license to operate a hazardous waste facility.' 4 6 Since the trial
court failed to make any determination on the intent of the bankruptcy trustee in this respect, the court remanded the case for
such a determination.

14 7

The clear import of the Wisconsin Appeals Court's decision
in Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc. 148 is that both a Chapter 11
144. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
145. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Tenth Circuit test because "Sherr has been cited with approval in dictum in the Seventh Circuit."
Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, 466 N.W.2d at 246 (citing In re Chicago Pacific
Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1985)). However the appeals court in referring to the Sherr decision stated that "Sherr probably errs when it says a bankruptcy trustee is never personally liable for acts of negligence toward the estate
or third persons." d. at 247.
146. Id.
147. Id. The appeals court rejected a number of arguments by Zenner
which had to do with the nature of the hazardous waste generated and the relationship of the zinc shop property to Wisconsin environmental law. Id. at 24445. It further rejected Zenner's claim that the bankruptcy court in its September, 1989 decision decided the issue of trustee liability and thus the issue of his
liability was subject to resjudicata. d. at 245. Finally, the appeals court's decision dealt with the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 247. Noting
the equitable nature of bankruptcy and the greater protection afforded bankruptcy trustees by the courts, the appeals court opined that the state must prove
intentional conduct on the part of the trustee. Id. at 246-47. "If we add to the
equitable equation the potential devastating impact personal liability would have
upon the pool of persons willing to serve as trustees in toxic waste cases, fairness
demands that the government prove deliberate conduct as an element of personal liability." Id. at 247. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988)(bankruptcy court concerned that potential personal liability
would discourage people from becoming trustees). The appeals court further
ruled that section 959(b) of Title 28 "has no bearing" on the personal liability of
Matyas or Zenner. Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d at 247 n.3.
Opined the appeals court: "Neither the statute itself nor the cases dealing with it
suggest a Congressional intent to impose personal liability." d. at 247. The
court of appeals also had a problem with the interplay between section 959(b)
and the strict liability imposed by the relevant Wisconsin environmental statutes:
[T]here is an inherent inconsistency between the state's concession that
negligence must be proven as an element of liability and its interpretation of sec. 959(b). If that statute is meant to impose personal liability
for violation of state law, then it follows that the strict liability statute
involved here ...

is enforceable without proof of either negligence or

intent.
Id.
Thus, the court's decision came down to a single issue, whether Zenner and
Matyas "knowingly or intentionally failed to obtain" a license to operate a hazardous waste facility. Id.
148. 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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and a Chapter 7 trustee will be personally liable if it can be shown
that one "knowingly and intentionally failed to obtain a license"
to generate toxic waste.' 4 9 Since the Appeals Court did not seem
to think that section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, which requires
federal trustees to manage the property under their control in
compliance with applicable state law,' 50 was necessary to impose
personal liability on a bankruptcy trustee, such personal liability
would potentially be imposed based solely on violations of state
environmental law.' 5 ' To the extent a state can bypass federal
law concerning personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee, such
trustees could find themselves liable under state environmental
statutes for actions that would be valid under federal law. This
presents additional problems for bankruptcy trustees in hazardous waste cases, who are not afforded the protection provided by
a developed body of federal law. As is shown by the facts of the
Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc. case much state law liability
could be avoided if the bankruptcy trustee was able to abandon
52
contaminated property of the estate.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The effect of the Midlantic decision on both the environmental and bankruptcy laws has been extensive. It has created, as a
practical matter, numerous areas of conflict between these two areas of the law and has provided few, if any, viable solutions.
Courts across the nation are struggling to resolve many of these
issues, but as yet many remain unanswered.
The Midlantic decision has created the potential for a bank149. Id.
150. For a discussion of section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, see supra note
51 and accompanying text.
151. There is of course a question of whether a state could impose personal
liability on a bankruptcy trustee without section 959(b), since such an imposition
would have potential supremacy clause problems. In Wisconsin v. Better-BritePlating, it seems obvious that both Zenner and Matyas exceeded their authority as
bankruptcy trustees in generating and accumulating hazardous waste in violation of Wisconsin law. Thus, they violated section 959(b) of the Judiciary Code.
152. In a case where the bankruptcy trustee has some funds available, it is
certainly not fair to allow a toxic polluter to dump his contaminated property on
the state and federal government for cleanup. But where the bankruptcy estate
is incapable of cleaning up the polluted property, it makes little sense to waste
court time, generate legal fees, and impose personal liability on bankruptcy
trustees just for the sake of the well meant, but misplaced, policy that toxic polluters should not be able to abandon contaminated property in bankruptcy.
Eventually, the state and/or federal governments will have to cleanup the property anyway, so it makes sense to skip the futile legal machinations and abandon
the property to the proper authorities.
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ruptcy trustee to be held personally liable based solely on his status as a trustee. 53 This potential for liability affects Chapter 7
trustees the most due to the fact that Chapter 7 debtors generally
54
do not have sufficient funds to cleanup contaminated property.1
Moreover, the costs involved in cleaning up a waste site, coupled
with the already weakened financial state of a Chapter 11 debtor,
combine to increase the chances that a Chapter 11 debtor with a
polluted asset will eventually have to resort to Chapter 7.155 The
simple fact that a bankruptcy trustee could be personally liable for
the costs of a hazardous waste cleanup just because of his or her
status as a trustee is disturbing and ludicrous. To the extent that
such potential personal liability will discourage people from becoming bankruptcy trustees, the Midlantic decision has potentially
56
dealt a serious blow to the operation of the bankruptcy system.
The inability to abandon contaminated property of the estate
under Midlantic has caused other problems as well. In the case of
In re Smith-Douglass,'5 7 the Fourth Circuit held that the cost of
cleaning up a waste site was an administrative expense under section 507(a)(1) of the Code.' 5 8 Because administrative expenses
have priority over all but secured creditors, any unencumbered
assets of the estate would go first to the cleanup of the hazardous
waste site and then to the unsecured creditors. 5 9 In this scenario, the unsecured creditors would end up paying for the cleanup,
a public cost which, if not borne by the debtor or other responsi153. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988);
Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
154. For a discussion of how potential liability affects a Chapter 7 trustee,
see supra notes 71-80.
155. See, e.g., In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); In
re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94 Bankr. 924 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Franklin Signal
Corp., 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
156. See In re Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(court expresses concern that trustee liability would deter qualified individuals
from becoming trustees.) At this time, the full affects of the Midlantic decision
on the bankruptcy trustee system are difficult to approximate. With courts approaching the problem in so many different fashions, the exact impact of Midlantic on the trustee system will not become evident until a superior appeals court
deals directly with the issue.
157. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
158. Id. at 17; In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118, 123 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("We think it proper that the response costs incurred by Tennessee
and recoverable under CERCLA be deemed an administrative expense").
Under the Code administrative expenses take priority over everything except the
claims of secured creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726.
159. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726.
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ble party, should be borne by the state or federal governments. 160
Imposing cleanup costs on the unsecured creditors would amount
to penalizing them for conducting business with the debtor.
While the federal and state governments are not responsible for
the contamination of the debtor's property, the contamination itcleanup should be
self is a public problem and thus the cost of
16 1
businesses.
private
not
public,
the
by
borne
In a Chapter 11 setting, the inability to abandon polluted
property forces the trustee or debtor in possession to expend estate assets to cleanup the site. Since there would be fewer available funds in the bankruptcy estate, the amount of debt which the
estate would be able to pay before discharge 6 2 would be smaller.
This would limit the amount secured creditors would eventually
of the
receive and would result in the imposition of at least part 163
creditors.
unsecured
as
well
as
cost of cleanup on secured
In a larger sense, there are important public policy concerns
involved in a Midlantic type situation. The inability of the trustee
to abandon a toxic waste site will force the trustee, who in most
instances does not have the expertise necessary to effect the
160. See Comment, Toxic Wastes Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 17, at
365. Further, favoring the cleanup of the waste site in this manner is contrary to
the purpose of a Chapter 7 proceeding--"to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors holding just demands." Kothe v.
R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); see United States v. Guglielmi, 819
F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988); In re Franklin Signal
Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 270 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
161. See Comment, Toxic Wastes Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 17, at
365. Inasmuch as the public will be ultimately hurt by the dumping of toxic
waste, the clean up of that waste is a public cost. CERCLA itself was enacted to
protect the public health, safety and welfare. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public
health and the environment"). It is not equitable to hold secured and unsecured
creditors, whose only crime was to do business with a toxic polluter, liable for
the public cost of cleanup.
The converse of this argument is that those secured and unsecured creditors who did transact business with a toxic polluter derived a benefit from doing
such business, and thus should be at least partially responsible for the cleanup
costs.
162. Under Chapter 11, a plan of reorganization is formulated, in which it
is determined how much of each kind of debt must be repaid by the debtor
before the remainder of such debts are discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 1123. The
Chapter 11 plan, however, must be approved by a certain percentage of the
creditors of the estate. Id. § 1126. Thus the creditors do have some control
over the disposition of the estate.
163. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 51, at 70. "The unstated implications
of Midlantic and Quanta Resources are that creditors both secured and unsecured
can be made to pay for these cleanup expenses. This constitutes a fundamental
change in the priority schedule of the bankruptcy law." Id.
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cleanup of the site, to solve complex environmental and scientific
questions.16 4 Certainly, it makes more sense to remove the contaminated property from the bankruptcy estate so that state and
federal environmental agencies, who do have the necessary expertise, can cleanup the site.' 65 Allowing the state and federal
agencies to have a "super-priority" lien on the contaminated
property would give such agencies the opportunity to recover
166
some clean up costs before other creditors.
Presently, courts are dealing with the problem of trustee personal liability in various ways.16 7 Some courts have chosen to ignore trustee liability completely, 168 while other courts have used
creative interpretations of the both the Code and federal and
state environmental laws to resolve this issue.' 6 9 Whatever may
be said about the cause of the problem, a permanent solution
must come from either Congress or the Supreme Court, since
these are the only bodies with the power to overrule or amend the
Midlantic decision.

One solution would be to amend the Code to limit the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee. If trustees were protected
against personal liability under the Code, the application of the
Midlantic decision-preventing the abandonment of contaminated
property that fails to comply with state environmental statuteswould be made that much easier. Another solution would be to
create a Code section which not only establishes definite standards for the abandonment of polluted properties, but also provides who will pay for cleanup if the property is not
abandoned. 170 By delineating who is responsible for cleanup
costs any liability of a trustee would be foreseeable, and thus
164. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 51, at 85.
165. See, e.g. In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 214 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1988).
166. See, e.g. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912, 919 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1989).
167. See In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 105 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989); In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). For a discussion
of how different courts are dealing with the problem of the personal liability of a
trustee, see supra notes 92-121 and accompanying text.
168. See In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987). For a discussion of the Hemingway court's method of dealing with potential personal liability of a trustee, see supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
169. See In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989); In re
Microfab, Inc., 105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re 82 Milbar Blvd.,
Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989).
170. See Comment, Toxic Wastes Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 17, at
372-74.
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could be accommodated. Congress could also solve this problem
by amending the Code to prevent the acceptance of a reorganization plan under Chapter 11 or the discharge of debts under Chapter 7 until a way of cleaning up the contaminated property is
found. 171
The best solution would be for Congress to bring into harmony the conflicting policy concerns of the Code, protection of
the public health, and protection of public funds. 7 2 Clearly, it
makes sense to put the protection of public health and safety
above the purposes of the Code, but when there is a conflict between protection of public funds and the Code, the Code should
73
prevail.'
Until a solution is found, the problem of the personal liability
of a bankruptcy trustee for environmental cleanup costs, along
with the rest of the problems spawned by the Supreme Court's
decision in Midlantic, will continue to generate needless litigation
for the courts.
D. Ethan Jeffery
171. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1126. However, this solution could not only
greatly prolong bankruptcy proceedings, but also would place the public burden
of clean up on the creditors of the estate. See supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
172. In one sense, the Midlantic decision was as much about money as it was
about protection of the public health. "Justice Rehnquist recognized the harsh
reality of the majority decision-that the decision was based not just on protecting the public health and safety, but also on protecting the public fisc." Note,
Hazardous Wastes and the Bankrupt Firm, supra note 3, at 709.
173. In this sense, all that is happening is that money is being shuffled from
one place to another. The public should bear the costs of cleaning up hazardous
waste sites since they will be most benefitted, but to the extent that private businesses are forced to do so they will pass these costs onto the public anyway.
Substantial amounts of money, in court and legal fees if nothing else, could be
saved by having state or federal agencies cleanup these contaminated properties
in the first place.
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